There are four main ingredients in the conceptual systems utilized by psychiatrists in the diagnosis and treatment of psychiatric disorder and the scientific exploration of its causes. The prominence with which they figure and the closeness with which they are interconnected vary among psychiatrists of differing affiliations. In the systems of some psychiatrists one may predominate to the total exclusion of the others. Many psychiatrists, perhaps the majority, find such one-sided commitments hazardous and unfruitful and take from each the ingredients that they find useful. Lest this should be misinterpreted it has to be said at the outset that such eclecticism, balanced and reasonable though it seems, is not necessarily more effective in clinical work or more productive in scientific enquiry than the more one-sided approach.
The first of the contributory streams I shall discuss is the descriptive taxonomic approach which places the main emphasis on phenomenology in the sense of systematic description, analysis and classification of clinical phenomena. In the teaching of Kraepelin the emphasis was on the clinical phenomena accessible to immediate observation. In the phenomenology of Husserl and Jaspers the subjective aspects of clinical events, the psychic experiences viewed from within, became the focus of interest. Both sought after orderly groupings or classification of the phenomena they investigated. The second is the psychodynamic tradition which stems mainly from Freud and his disciples who seek for causes or explanations of mental life in conflicts derived from past experiences that have been submerged in the unconscious. The third, which has sprung into prominence in recent years, originates from the contributions of Pavlov and later of Hull and Skinner; learning theory has some common denominators with psychoanalysis which postulates that a special kind of learning process constitutes the main determinant of human personality as also of the disorders to which it is subject. The fourth stream is social psychiatry and seeks for the causes of psychiatric disorder, or for factors influencing its course and outcome, in the relationship between the individual and his social environment.
The Descriptive Taxonomic Approach The two great founders of the modern descriptive school of clinical psychiatry were Kraepelin and Jaspers. Kraepelin concerned himself with the objective manifestations of psychiatric disorders. He placed his hopes in the Virchowian concepts of disease and, when anatomy and pathology failed to resolve psychiatry's central problems, he looked to heredity, course and outcome to reveal the natural families of diseases he believed to exist. Jaspers concentrated on a precise description and differentiation of the inner experience of psychiatric disorders. His 'General Psychopathology' had a far-reaching influence upon Continental psychiatrists and it tends to be overlooked that such contributions as the work of Schneider on primary delusions and the 'process' symptoms of schizophrenia and that of Mayer-Gross on inner experiences in the course of intoxication with cocaine, mescaline, LSD and his studies of delusions and depersonalization phenomena were in the phenomenological tradition.
However, in the half century since the publication of Jaspers' seminal work, phenomenology has shown little sign of moving forward. This may have owed something to the fact that he and his followers eschewed all attempts to formulate causal theories, confining themselves strictly to the facts of empirical observation; this is notwithstanding that phenomenological enquiries have implicit in them certain theoretical assumptions which need to be made explicit and demand experimental validation. The criticism often made by psychoanalysts that phenomenology ignores the historical dimension is not perhaps wholly just, in that the distinction between the 'understandable' sequence of events characteristic of personality development, for example, and the step-like 'process' in the evolution of psychoses presupposes some historical exploration and analysis. However, investigation of the historical dimension was not pressed very far. Further, the distinctions between subjective and objective methods of enquiry, between causal and meaningful association, and between 'process' and 'development' were drawn too sharply and made for the inflexibility of the phenomenological school that limited its effectiveness in the exploration of psychiatric phenomena.
The Kraepelinian system may appear naive in the light of contemporary ideas about oetiology and classification but it was clear, testable in its more important postulates and, like many other simplistic theoretical systems in science, it proved fruitful. Its essentials form the foundation of classifications of mental disorder in every part of the world. The nosological entities of Kraepelin have been identified in sociocultural environments ranging from the most primitive to the most advanced, among the poverty-stricken and the affluent, the privileged and under-privileged alike. Moreover, the psychiatric developments of the past fifty years have, on the whole, confirmed its essential soundness. Thus the selectiveness in the effects of convulsive treatment and of phenothiazine and antidepressant drugs have, to a large extent, validated the distinctions between psychoses and neuroses, schizophrenia and manicdepressive illness and the different forms of depression.
It is, however, the paradoxes inherent in the Kraepelinian system that have led to some of the most promising lines of enquiry in recent years.
Classificatory schemes should ideally be based upon a single principle, but this is rarely possible in any field of biology, and the Kraepelinian scheme had this defect in common with other taxonomic systems of proven value. Both a descriptive or symptomatological and an itio-logical principle are implicit in all the classificatory systems that have originated from Kraepelin. Thus the distinction between organic and functional disorders may be made on the basis of certain psychological symptoms and signs (dementia, delirium, amnestic syndromes, &c.), in other words, on the strength of symptomatological criteria, or by ascertaining whether or not structural disease is present. These two criteria will generally yield identical results. There is, however, a marginal group of cases in which the two sets of criteria elicit contradictory answers. To this territory belong the schizophrenia-like disorders associated with amphetamine intoxication, chronic epilepsy, chronic alcoholism and a wide range of cerebral diseases, the lesions of which show a pronounced tendency to be located around the third ventricle and diencephalon (Davison 1966) . The association between functional disorder and organic disease is not confined to schizophrenia. When defined in terms of symptoms and signs alone, each of the functional syndromes contains within its boundaries a minority of cases with cerebral organic disease.
The work of the last two or three decades has shown that these phenomena can no longer be dismissed as the result of coincidence. This view was most categorically expressed by Kraepelin when he stated that schizophrenia was an outgrowth of the constitution and not produced by exogenous causes (Brill 1941) . The evidence is, in fact, most complete and convincing in relation to schizophrenia for, as Davison's scholarly review (Davison & Bagley 1969) has shown, an illness, indistinguishable from schizophrenia, occurs with a frequency beyond chance expectation in association with epilepsy, cerebral trauma and tumour, Huntington's chorea and narcolepsy, among other brain diseases. This marginal group of cases, in which functional disease is simulated by cerebral lesions, is relatively small, but when account is taken of the overla) between 'functional' and all forms of cerebral and somatic disease, the extent to which these cases figure in ordinary clinical practice is far from negligible. Moreover, the significance of these cases for scientific enquiry is great. The precise significance of the findings in Hillbom's important monograph (1960) on the long-term effects of gunshot wounds to the head, with its large yield of cases of neurotic disturbance, character disorder, suicide and schizophrenia-like illness, is of considerable importance for the theory and practice of psychiatry: 38-5 % of the subjects studied were found to suffer from some form of illness or personality disorder and there were no fewer than 37 suicides out of 3,552 cases during the follow-up period of over fifteen years. Further landmarks in the exploration of this small but fertile borderland are the observations which have demonstrated a clear causal association between cerebral disease and psychiatric illness in children, infantile autism in particular (Graham & Rutter 1968) , the studies that have shown physical illness to be causally linked with affective disorders both in old (Roth & Kay 1956 ) and younger people (Kerr et al. 1969 ) and those that have shown an association between cerebral disease and hysterical syndromes (Slater 1961 , Whitlock 1967 ). In the case of a random sample of the aged in the community, those with affective disorder showed a substantial decrease in life-expectation as compared with the normal population (Kay & Bergmann 1966 ) so that the associated disorders found were unlikely to be fortuitous.
In these areas, psychiatry is moving into a territory with a multitude of unresolved problems that have implications also for neurological science. If cerebral or physical disease can contribute to causing schizophrenic or depressive states or character disorders, why are some persons selected while the majority remain immune? Evidence has begun to indicate where some answers may be found. In the case of the neurotic disturbance and personality disorders following head injury (Dencker 1958 ) and alcoholic hallucinosis (Benedetti 1952 ) some measure of predisposition to breakdown had often been present, although the evidence for this is suggestive rather than precise. This is, however, only part of the explanation. The size, depth, rate of development and location of lesions in the case of cerebral disease appear to be important, although the precise effect of such factors awaits definition. Lesions in the neighbourhood of the temporal lobes and limbic system appear particularly prone to give rise to psychiatric disturbances. It has to be said, however, that the bewildering variety of illnesses that may follow brain damage are difficult to explain and detract from the plausibility of wtiological explanations in terms of cerebral lesions alone.
The cerebral lesions may be no more than crude markers whose importance is that they activate the specific and more delicate functional changes concerned. These may have a biochemical rather than structural basis.
It would be surprising in this connexion if the discovery of biogenic amines in discrete sites in the brain (Amin et al. 1954 , Vogt 1954 ) and the observations made in recent years on the metabolism of catecholamines (Schildkraut & Kety 1967) , indolamines (Brodie & Shore 1957 , Ashcroft et al. 1966 ) and electrolytes (Coppen et al. 1965) in the affective disorders failed to bear fruit so as to provide a better understanding of the pathophysiology or etiology of depressive disorders.
The demarcation lines of the Kraepelinian system have required loosening or adjustment in other places. If cerebral disease or disturbance has to be reckoned with as contributing to causation among the functional disorders, psychogenesis and the factors underlying functional disorder have to be accorded some relevance within the group of disorders that are 'organic' in their clinical features. The 'psychogenic psychoses' (Schipkowensky 1960 , Faergeman 1945 , the 'Emotionspsychosen' (Labhardt 1963 ) and the 'culture-bound reactive syndromes' (Yap 1967) combine the features of precipitation by overwhelming stress, florid hallucinations and delusions and clouding to the point of delirium and suggest a certain amount of common ground in a symptomatological (and probably also a neurological) sense between neuroses, psychoses and certain organic disorders. In the light of recent findings (Kay & Roth 1961;  McClelland & Roth 1969, unpublished observations) I believe also that the reactive paranoid disorders of the deaf will ultimately have something important to tell us about the oetiology of schizophrenia.
Other limitations arise in relation to the neuroses and personality disorders, where theories based largely upon genetic, constitutional or organic concepts alone are not tenable in the light of observations made during the last few decades. Although genetical factors have been shown to contribute in vulnerability to neurotic disorder as shown, for example, by the concordance rate for anxiety states of 47 % among identical twins (Slater & Shields 1969) , this figure also makes plain the importance of environmental factors. There is no lack of independent evidence for their contribution. Neither in relation to neurosis nor to delinquency, nor in connexion with schizophrenia for that matter, can the psychiatrist nurtured mainly in the organic tradition fail to be impressed by the need to take account of, and to define further, the role of psychological, social and familial factors.
The Sociological Model
During the past few decades there has been rapid expansion of interest in the social aspects of mental disorder. Sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists and psychiatrists have investigated problems such as the influence of different kinds of hospital and home environment upon the clinical progress and mode of readaptation of schizophrenic and other patients, differences in the incidence and mode of manifestation of psychiatric disorder in different cultural settings, and the contribution of social and familial influences to the causation of psychiatric illness and personality disorder. Perhaps the most impressive achievements have come from attacks upon problems of a limited and clearly definable nature. One could instance analysis of the role of sociofamilial factors in the evolution and management of mental subnormality (Clarke & Clarke 1958 ); analysis of the ingredients of mental hospital environments, associated with variations in the course of schizophrenic illness; and study of the influence of social environment, after discharge, upon patterns of outcome (Wing 1962 , Wing & Brown 1961 .
Against a larger canvas, social influences upon mental illness have been less easy to define. The effect of the sociocultural environment upon human welfare is incontestable, yet the classical variables of sociologysocial class, poverty, isolation, mobility and urban lifehave failed so far to shed clear light on the causation of mental illness. The mental health of those living in an urban environment, with its presumed impersonality, uniformity, isolation and enforced conformity, has proved not to be inferior to the mental health of those living in a rural setting, whether in Sweden, Croydon or Nigeria. Elderly people suffering from neurotic disorder or depression, and schizophrenics of all ages found living in relative isolation, prove on the whole to have segregated themselves over the course of years. Their social predicament reflects a distinctive and life-long style of existence and proves largely to be a consequence of premorbid personality traits rather than a cause of illness (Kay & Roth 1961 , Kay 1963 , Lowenthal 1964 , Hare 1956 .
The adverse social circumstances of a high proportion of schizophrenics appear to be largely the consequence of drift down the social scale owing to social and occupational failure resulting from illness or from the anomalies of personality that preceded it. The high incidence of mental disorder among those who migrate to other countries, among the single, and the variations of incidence in different occupational groups have been shown by the work of 0degaard (1932, 1956, 1957, 1962) to be due mainly to 'social selection' of those predisposed, rather than to social stress.
Suicide is perhaps the most impressive example to date of the influence of one of the timehonoured major social variablessocial cohesion on mental disorder, for a number of studies have revealed a pattern of prevalence that Durkheim (1897) would have predicted. The decline in suicide rates with each major war or revolution has continued from the last century to this. But in excluding individual mental disorder as a significant link in the chain of causation Durkheim argued from false premises.
The association between delinquency and social disorganization is well established; and high grade subnormality and attempted suicide (Kessel 1965 ) are found to be highly prevalent in social environments that are in certain respects similar. This exemplifies Knox's law of conglomeration of social impairments (Knox 1962) or, as Woodger has put it, 'even the best genes in the world do little in concentrated sulphuric acid' (Woodger 1956 ). However, slum neighbourhoods will warp a child's personality only if he is in some way rendered vulnerable. Moreover, knowledge of the causation of schizophrenia, manicdepressive illness, sexual deviation and most forms of personality disorder has not been significantly advanced by investigation of classical sociological variables such as social class, mobility, poverty and disorganization. We also know that the main groups of psychiatric disorder are recognizable in a wide range of cultural settings from the most advanced to the most primitive and there is no satisfactory evidence suggesting wide variations in prevalence. The psychiatrist who hopes to be rescued from the inherent difficulties of his own subject may overlook the fact that the behavioural sciences are not in a position, at the present time, to offer general theories of social behaviour or indeed general laws of any kind.
These are among the factors that have led psychiatrists and social scientists to look more intensively at the microcosm of the family for the relevant variables that might illuminate the problems of psychiatric disorder. Values and attitudes, aspirations and ambitions, expectations and pressuresas well as levels of education, income and methods of child careare being studied. However, these are not purely sociological variables. For example, in relation to children, the investigator has to face the fact that individual patterns of selectivity, exploration and responsiveness appear to play a significant part in delineating the child's effective environment (Clarke 1968 ). The underlying characteristics are evident from an early age and, although the explanation for this may not be genetical, it is difficult to think of plausible alternatives.
The Psychodynamic Model The practice of psychiatry can hardly do without psychodynamics of some kind in the sense of employing a method of historical recapitulation in the analysis of certain problemsthose of neurosis, psychopathy, sexual deviation and personality disorder in particular. One may hold that psychiatric disorder cannot be wholly explained by past events and that a new dimension enters. But setting the present in the context of past experience is indispensable to the psychiatrist and, to this extent at any rate, the teaching of Freud and psychodynamics have come to stay.
The practising psychiatrist finds daily evidence of deprivation, rejection and overprotection, family disruption, violence and humiliation in the early formative years of his patients with neurotic and personality disorders. Among homosexuals he notes the exceptionally intense, ambiguously poised and emotionally overdependent relationship to their mothers and the imbalance in the psychological influence of the two parents. To some extent such observations are confirmed by controlled observations although they vary in rigour.
However, the task of assessing the relative importance of environmental, social, familial and genetical factors, and of scientifically disentangling the network of interacting causes and effects remains, for the large part, a task for the future. Moreover, psychodynamic and environmentalist theories of a simplistic kind leave the crucial questions unanswered. Why do some children and not others suffer? Why do certain families produce neurotic, delinquent or generally unstable persons while others, identical in all significant respects, do not? What significance is to be attributed to the mother-dominated family setting of the homosexual when we find identical patterns in anxiety neurotics, schizophrenics, girls with anorexia nervosa, Irish alcoholics and Jewish heroin addicts ? There is a widening acknowledgment of these and other problems among those interested in the psychodynamic aspects of psychiatry. Moreover, it is increasingly recognized that the claims of psychoanalysis as an explanatory theory for the historical origins of neurotic and other symptoms on the one hand, and as a form of treatment on the other, have to be kept apart. Evidence as rigorous as the situation permits may become available that the pattern of development of phobic, paranoid and sexually deviant subjects conforms to predictions from psychoanalytic theory. This would tell us nothing of the therapeutic claims of psychoanalysis which can be substantiated only by objective evidence that it succeeds in resolving or mitigating such disorders. It is a commonplace that such symptoms regularly persist unchanged after many years of psychotherapy, although the attitudes of patients may be modified in certain respects. This persistence of symptoms which are held to express, in the symbolic language of the unconscious, the patient's unresolved conflicts, suggests that psychodynamic theories, even where they have undoubted relevance, are not enough. Moreover, recent evidence has shown that the irreversibility of the effects of early learning and experience cannot be invoked to rescue purely psychodynamic theories; the evidence in favour of such irreversibility has proved to lack solid foundation.
A number of workers have recently attempted to extract from psychoanalytic teaching those central propositions which would command fairly wide assent. I refer in particular to the papers of Kardiner et al. (1959) and the propositions advanced by Cattell (1965) as being those which perhaps would command 'an uneasy consensus'. A number of these propositions could be restated in forms that should make possible the deductive development of hypotheses testable in the clinical situation. That childhood experience is of importance for the causation of neurotic symptoms in adult life would probably command a wide measure of agreement. So would the proposition that a substantial part of motivation arises from levels of psychological and cerebral activity that are not accessible to consciousness. The view that the conflicts between collective drives of the id and the self-regarding parts of the personality or ego, and between the ego and the organized body of moral imperatives acquired from parents and environment, are among the sources of neurosis and maladjustment provides the underlying rationale for much of the psychotherapy given to neurotic patients in ordinary psychiatric practice.
That patients unconsciously employ mechanisms such as repression, projection, sublimation, displacement, symbolization in their attempts to grapple with painful emotions and that these mechanisms provide explanations for the formation of some symptoms of neurotic illness are also views that have extensively influenced clinical practice.
There are four groups of facts to convince the open-minded psychodynamicist that his own approach is not viable in psychiatric practice without the complement of others in every field. The first is the failure of all knowledge of psychopathology and skill in psychotherapy to elicit better results in obsessive-compulsive states, phobic states, sexual deviations and personality disorders, among others. The second is the effectiveness of physical methods of treatment in depressive illness and mania which have an interesting and relevant psychopathology. The third is the very high incidence of psychiatric disorder of all kinds, neurotic and psychotic, that complicates cerebral injury and disease (Hillbom 1960 , Lishman 1968 , Graham & Rutter 1968 and is unconnected with disablement. A fourth reason is that in a number of phenomenacertainly in delinquency, suicide and drug addiction the social dimension is of proven importance is and only partly an outgrowth of individual psychopathology.
TheLearning Theory Model Attempts have been made in recent years to trace the parallels between explanations of neurotic disorder in terms of psychoanalytic and learning theory. Both seek for the explanations of current behaviour in past experience; there are similarities between primary process thinking and classical conditioning and between secondary process thinking and instrumental conditioning (Kimble 1961 , Marks & Gelder 1966 . Psychoanalysis postulates after all that from a learning process of a certain kind, taking place in the context of the child-parent relationship, flow the motivating forces of personality development.
The recent revival of interest in learning theory has fostered important experimental studies of psychiatric treatment, many of them conspicuous for the fastidiousness with which the procedures to be undertaken were specified and the rigour with which results were evaluated with the aid of methods of proven validity and reliability (Marks & Gelder 1965 , Gelder & Marks 1966 . The whole subject has stimulated much rethinking of the acquired aspects of mental disorder and has served to engender a more flexible outlook in psychiatrists of dynamic, organic and eclectic orientation alike. The disorders which can be satisfactorily explained by learning theory and which respond best to treatment are, however, mainly of a relatively simple kind. Monosymptomatic phobias and simple fetishism, rather than the more complex neuroses and deviations, have shown the most striking benefits and it is of interest that in these conditions some component of the disability can be traced back to childhood.
This raises some of the reasons why learning theory fails to provide satisfactory explanations for most neuroses and personality disorders. In more complex neuroses such as the 'agoraphobias' the onset is in the late 20s and may be delayed until the 40s or 50s. Anxiety-provoking circumstances and a cluster of minor phobias have often been present in childhood, but a latent period of decades, in which there has been no reinforcement or generalization of the early symptoms, is difficult to explain in learning theory terms. Again the very wide range of symptoms and disabilities occurring within the phobic anxiety-depersonalization states, such as frigidity, sustained tension, depersonalization, derealization, panic attacks, syncope, hysterical symptoms and depression, defy explanation in learning theory terms alone. The situation is similar for obsessional states, anxiety states, depressions and paranoid disorders whose onset may be deferred until middle age or even late life. Investigating these patients in detail one can, of course, trace some threads of continuity between the illness and the traits and mode of adjustment of the premorbid personality. But neither these more complex forms of illness nor the essential features of the personality in which they occur are susceptible to alteration by behaviour therapy. An Approach Towards Integration Each of the four main conceptual models comes up against limitations in its own approach and is compelled to import other dimensions if it is to account even tentatively for the observations with which it deals. The organic approach has to make more flexible and more adventurous use 8f its concepts and has to allow for the effects of learning and experience and, to some extent, for social influences in deciding whether or not the inherent potentialities for maladjustment or illness become manifest. Psychodynamicists are faced with the autonomy, persistence and resistance to alteration of many forms of illness and personality disorder. They cannot regard the child as a tabuila rasa, for soon after birth such features as regularity, adaptability, mood intensity, approachwithdrawal characteristics, persistence, distractability and threshold of response to a number of stimuli are evident and persist throughout childhood (Chess et al. 1963) . They have to seek for hypotheses of causation of psychiatric phenomena that embody both historical factors and cerebral dysfunction. The sociological approach has to come to terms with the fact that the variables it is accustomed to handle are relatively uninformative, probably because they are too remote from the influences that shape the individual's weaknesses and strengths. It has been shown, for example, that the child selects his environment and that without detailed, on-the-spot evaluation it is not possible to specify what the effective environment has been. As it takes a closer look at relevant environmental influences, sociology is compelled to take account of genetics, dynamics, the effects of learning and of brain damage, among other physical concomitants of socioeconomic underprivilege. And learning theory has to seek in all these other dimensions for explanations of its helplessness in complex disorders and failure to explain the mode of evolution of most forms of psychiatric disorder.
Awareness that a mtultitude of influences contribute at many levels to the causation of mental disorder has already exerted a profound influence upon contemporary psychiatric practice. The treatment and rehabilitation of patients often entails intensive efforts with spouses and parents and practical steps to serve the welfare of children. It demands effective two-way communica-tions with community agencies, teachers and magistrates, as well as treatment along physical, psychotherapeutic and, perhaps, neurological lines. The psychiatric team, and the child psychiatric team in particular, strives to mitigate or rectify aggression, rejection, unhealthy patterns of dominance, dependence or possessiveness within the family using, for the most part, intuitive and green-fingered skills. It gives advice to teachers, magistrates and courts and helps to enlighten the general public in mental health matters. This widening of horizons and range of practical activities is desirable and inevitable.
The danger is that we should mistake all this movement and activity for advance and fail to appreciate the slender factual foundation on which contemporary practice rests. The achievements and results of all these activities demand critical evaluation. We know little of the causes underlying the disorders or the weight to be attached to the different factorsphysical, social, neurological, familial, dynamic and geneticalwhere these are known or suspected to contribute. The relative importance of such variables could, however, be more precisely determined with the aid of empirical investigations. An objective towards which it would be worth harnessing co-operative efforts during the next ten to fifteen years is a psychiatric phenomenology that incorporates information about physical and neurological disorder, sociological, familial and dynamic variables as well as conventional psychiatric descriptive features. Extended descriptions of this nature are not possible at present for we do not know the strength of the associations between psychiatric syndromes and these other variables. They could only be discovered with the aid of carefully planned enquiries with controls in which all such variables would be examined simultaneously. These would be not only quests for more complete descriptions but enquiries into the wetiological bases of psychiatric disorders. Relatively hard data such as economic status of the family, bereavement and separation, education, family size and structure, would need to be treated apart from softer data such as patterns of dominance and discipline, ambitions and aspirations of parents, neurotic traits, sexual adjustment and adverse pressures upon the family. With the aid of modern techniques of multivariate analysis and the high-speed electronic computer, such a search for clusters and patterns of associations between psychiatric features and other variables would be entirely feasible.
Concluiling Remarks
I have discussed the four main approaches to the present-day problems of psychiatry. I should now like to draw attention to two wider issues. The first of these is what we are to regard as attainable goals for psychiatry. Some psychiatrists would like to see our main endeavour directed towards the treatment and scientific investigation of mental disorder; others prefer the more ambitious goal of an ideal state of community mental health. This divergence of view has something of the antithesis posed by Karl Popper (1963) between 'Utopian' and 'piecemeal' social engineering. The 'Utopian' method 'chooses an ideal state of society as the aim which all our political actions should serve'. On the other hand, 'the piecemeal engineer will ... adopt the method of searching for and fighting against the greatest and most urgent evils of society, rather than searching for and fighting for its greatest ultimate good'. The antithesis is perhaps too sharply drawn. For all their imprecision, psychiatrists cannot wholly dispense with concepts such as emotional maturity and mental health which have something of the character of Utopian ideals. Psychiatrists and their professional colleagues use what they have learned intuitively and this I feel is desirable. However, it is as well to heed Popper's warning about Utopia. He points out that the choice between competing blueprints is always arbitrary. Hence: 'I consider what I call Utopianism as an attractive and, indeed, an all too attractive theory; for I also consider it dangerous and pernicious. It is I believe self-defeating.' There are, therefore, persuasive reasons for focusing clinical scientific effort on specific psychiatric disorders. To do justice to these immense problems we must avail ourselves of the best of each of the four conceptual models. This eclecticism is not a feeble compromise, but is inevitable. Concepts from the physical sciences suffice for investigating disorders of the body. But in attempting to understand disorders of the mind additional concepts are necessary: thus, for instance, it is not possible now and perhaps never will be possible adequately to describe the consequences of extensive cortical damage without invoking psychological as well as neurological concepts, although progress is likely to be made for an indefinite time ahead by translating the former into the latter. I should like to conclude by examining the way in which an increasing understanding of psychiatric illness is likely to proceed. Popper (1963) has argued that the hypotheses most likely to yield fresh knowledge are those cast in a form which allows them to be refuted. It would be wrong, however, to neglect the importance of theory, particularly that of a unifying kind. Hypotheses are always the product of theory. When they seem not to be so, when they seem to stand in a splendid neutral isolation, it is really that their theoretical background has not been made explicit, or is so much part of tradition that it is not seen as theory. Thus hypotheses and theory are not opposed but complementary. It would be a mistake to value one over the other; it is equally an error to overvalue technique and method and to underrate the importance of seeing novel problems and asking new questions. It is important, however, to recognize that, whereas good theory advances knowledge, bad theory may retard it.
It is sometimes difficult in psychiatry to distinguish between the two. Both offer a seemingly coherent account of a wide range of fact: the good theory because it is a backbone providing true unification; the bad because it is so flexible that it can be plastered like a skin on the facts, whatever their form. It is all too easy in psychiatry to excavate impressive confirmatory examples of every universal theory that claims to unfold truth about mental health and illness alike. Popper tells of a case reported to Adler in 1919 which he found 'no difficulty in analysing in terms of his theory of "inferiority feelings", although he had not even seen the child'. Popper was taken aback and asked him how he could be so certain. 'Because of my thousand fold experience', he replied, whereupon Popper could not help saying: 'And with this new case I suppose your experience has become a thousand and one fold.' However, good theories and fruitful hypotheses are most likely to take shape in the minds of those steeped in the investigation of mental illness and its borderlands. Here illness has pared down the multitudinous variables that govern normal behaviour to manageable proportions and the differences that demand explanation stand out clearly but only to the schooled eye. Psychiatry would, therefore, do well to build upwards from solid foundations in clinical enquiry and observation towards a modern nosology and theories of causation that provide full scope for the biological, psychological and sociological dimensions of illness. If progress were made in defining causes and establishing their order of importance and mode of interaction in anxiety neurosis and schizophrenia, psychiatry would have made at least a modest contribution towards resolving the conflicts and perplexities of the human condition.
